Issue 100

26 Jun: RAND released a report from Howard Wang, Gregory Graff, and Alexis Dale-Huangi investigating how Chinese military leadership sees themselves in competition with the US as both nations develop and deliver military power to space. The entire report can be found here. Excerpts below but recommend reading this excellent analysis in full! – The report surveys open-source literature across the Chinese defense enterprise to present a composite image of People’s Liberation Army (PLA) perspectives and key factors for U.S.-China crisis stability in space. It draws on authoritative Chinese writings to understand Chinese perceptions of threats from the United States by reviewing Chinese publications on U.S. intent and capabilities in space. The report additionally traces the evolution of PLA thinking on escalation dynamics in space over the past two decades. – Space power is a critical component of the CCP’s vision for China’s national rejuvenation. CCP leaders have repeatedly called on party members and the Chinese populace to work toward “realizing the Chinese Dream of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. -Space power in CCP thinking cannot be separated from military power…The 2020 Science of Military Strategy published by PLA’s NDU…argues, “in the context of the new military revolution, space has already become a new domain of military conflict, not only changing the traditional form of warfare of mankind, but also expanding the struggle for national strategic interests.” – To achieve China’s national rejuvenation, CCP leaders and China’s space enterprise believe China must dominate-and dominate militarily-in space. – PLA thinking on space conflict strongly suggests the belief that space is offense-dominant… The PLA’s official PME on space operations clearly defines space as an offense-dominant domain. It explicitly describes two dominant trends in the development of space technology: First, space-based capabilities are characterized as “strong on offense and weak on defense,” and second, space operational tempo continues to increase and shortens the decision space available to state leaders. – PLA literature emphasizes deterrence rather than stability in space. In PLA writings, deterrence is a tool to cow an adversary who would otherwise complicate Chinese activities, not an effort to prevent an adversary from destabilizing an environment. – PLA academics have used the Schriever Wargame as a locus for analyzing U.S. space capabilities. Studies of the wargame extend across major PLA PME institutions and consistently reveal the PLA impression that the annual wargame serves to accelerate U.S. development of offensive space capabilities to preserve space superiority. – NDU Professor Zhong Jing asserts that the United States is actively engaged in space cooperation with its allies to build a space alliance, draw allies in by sharing space situational awareness and promises of cooperative development, increase their dependencies on the United States, and ensure that potential opponents cannot use or access the allies’ space capabilities. PLA discourse indicates the PLA has operationalized new guidance to take more proactive and assertive actions in general while accepting higher levels of escalation risk that might arise as consequence…The PLA of 2020 and beyond is more likely to undertake coercive activities and accept the risk of escalation with the United States than it was a decade prior.