21 Oct 2025: LandSpace, a Chinese commercial launch company, is preparing for its first test launch of its partially reusable Zhuque-3 (ZQ-3) rocket. LandSpace completed a successful series of static test fires of the 9 Tianque-12A engines from 18-20 October at the Dongfeng Commercial Space Innovation Test Zone within the Jiuquan Satellite Launch Center in northwest China. The launch is currently set for no earlier than 3 November 2025. The ZQ-3 is comparable to the Falcon 9 in both size and lift capacity and also intends to have a reusable first stage. Unlike the Falcon 9, the ZQ-3 uses liquid methane and liquid oxygen (methaLOX) for propellant. We’ve talked about LandSpace in previous editions of the Flash as they were the first to ever use methaLOX to reach orbit on their ZQ-2 rocket in July of 2023. Developing an operational, reusable launch platform is a critical component to China’s ambitious plans to field multiple proliferated Low Earth Orbit satellite constellations. Video of June Static Fire. Video of Oct Static Fire.

– Excerpts from Mike Wall’s article on space.com:

• “LandSpace conducted a static-fire test with its stainless steel Zhuque-3 launcher on Monday (Oct. 20), keeping the rocket on track for a debut expected to occur before the end of the year.”
• “Zhuque-3 looks a lot like SpaceX’s workhorse Falcon 9 rocket, which also features a reusable first stage and an expendable upper stage. Like the Falcon 9, Zhuque-3’s booster is powered by nine engines — in this case, Tianque-12As, which LandSpace developed in house.”
• “The Tianque-12A employs liquid methane and liquid oxygen (LOX) propellants — a key difference with the Falcon 9, whose Merlin engines burn LOX and rocket-grade kerosene. (SpaceX‘s next-gen Raptor engine, which powers its Starship megarocket, uses LOX and liquid methane.)”
• “The 217-foot-tall (66 meters) Zhuque-3 can haul about 40,350 pounds (18,300 kilograms) to low Earth orbit (LEO). That’s in roughly the same ballpark as the Falcon 9, whose LEO payload capacity is 50,265 pounds (22,800 kg).”
• “The Oct 20 “static fire was the latest in a series of significant milestones for the Zhuque-3. For example, LandSpace performed low-altitude launch and landing tests with the vehicle last year, and it conducted a static fire this past June.”

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16 Oct 2025: China launched a Long March-8A from Taiyuan with the 12th group of SatNet LEO satellites (SatNet LEO Group 12) for the Guowang constellation. The launch carried 9 satellites (65995-66003) into a new 50.0° orbital plane. Launch Video.

– With this launch there are now 95 satellites in the operational Guowang constellation (see graphics & tables). Additionally, China has launched 18 Guowang test satellites.

– China is building out the Guowang constellation with orbits inclined either 50.0° or 86.5°. Currently there are 45 satellites in 5 50.0° orbital planes and 50 satellites in 6 86.5° orbital planes.

– Summary of Guowang Operational Launches

• Group 1 (16 Dec 2024): 10 sats on LM-5B. Orbit inclined 86.5°
• Group 2 (11 Feb 2025): 9 sats on LM-8A. Orbit inclined 50.0°
• Group 3 (28 Apr 2025): 10 sats on LM-5B. Orbit inclined 86.5°
• Group 4 (5 Jun 2025): 5 sats on LM-6A. Orbit inclined 86.5° (co-planar with Group 9)
• Group 5 (27 Jul 2025): 5 sats on LM-6A. Orbit inclined 86.5°
• Group 6 (30 Jul 2025): 9 sats on LM-8A. Orbit inclined 50.0°
• Group 7 (4 Aug 2025): 9 sats on LM-12. Orbit inclined 50.0°.
• Group 8 (13 Aug 2025): 10 sats on LM-5B. Orbit inclined 86.5°
• Group 9 (17 Aug 2025): 5 sats on LM-6A. Orbit inclined 86.5° (co-planar with Group 4)
• Group 10 (25 Aug 2025): 9 sats on LM-8A. Orbit inclined 50.0°.
• Group 11 (27 Sep 2025): 5 sats on LM-6A. Orbit inclined 86.5°.
• Group 12 (16 Oct 2025): 9 sats on a LM-8A. Orbit inclined 50.0°

– Observations

• For the 86.5° inclined orbits (Groups 01, 03, 04, 08, 09 & 11) the target SMA appears to be 1,167.9km. It appears the intended RAAN separation is ~30° between planes. Group 11 filled the remaining orbital plane on 27 Sep 2025 .
• Group 09’s 5 satellites are co-planar with the 5 Group 04 satellites. China’s initial deployment appears to be 10 satellites per 86.5° orbital plane. Expect the next 86.5° launch to augment the Group 05 or Group 11 satellites. (see graphic)
• The 50° orbital planes have 9 satellites and may have a standard operating altitude of 1,149.3km, however Group 2 is the only group to reach this SMA. Groups 6, 7, 10 & 12 continue to raise their altitudes.
  • Groups 10 & 12 orbital planes are only separated by ~5° of RAAN offset.

– Deployment Status (all data as of 19 Oct 2025)

• 86.5° Orbits (target SMA 1,167.9km)
  • Group 1 reached operating altitude in 110 days.
  • Group 3 reached operating altitude in 34 days.
  • Group 4 reached operating altitude in 106 days.
  • Group 5 reached operating altitude in 58 days.
  • Group 8 reached operating altitude in 32 days.
  • Group 9 reached operating altitude in 52 days.
  • Group 11 satellites started at an altitude of ~1,003km and are now at ~1,004-1008km and continue to raise their SMAs.

• 50.0° inclined orbits (target SMA 1,149.3km)
  • Group 2 reached operating altitude of 1,149.3km in 77 days
  • Group 6 continue to increase their SMA. They paused at 874km for 1 month but have resumed maneuvers to increase SMA.

• • Group 7 continue to increase their SMA. They paused at ~907.8km for 3 weeks but have resumed maneuvers to increase SMA. They are currently at ~1,015km.
  • Group 10 started at an altitude of ~873km and are now at ~1,045km and continue to increase their SMAs.
  • Group 12 stated at an altitude of ~873km and have begun to increase their altitudes with most reaching ~875km.

17 Oct: China launched a Long March-6A with the sixth batch of 18 SpaceSail satellites from Taiyuan. According to official sources, the SpaceSail Constellation (Qianfan Constellation), is developed by Shanghai SpaceSail Technologies Co., Ltd. to “provide global users with low-latency, high-speed and ultra-reliable satellite broadband internet services.” With this launch there are now has 108 satellites in orbit. This is the first Qianfan launch in 220 days, much longer than the cadence for the first 5 launches (54 days). A significant number of Qianfan satellites appear to have experienced issues in reaching their operational orbits. The increased time between launch 5 and 6 is likely due to troubleshooting. Launch Video.

– SpaceSail launched 6th batch Qianfan satellites into the orbital plane between batches 2 & 3 (see graphic). It appears the initial configuration of the Qianfan constellation will be 9 orbital planes separated by 20° of RAAN offset between each plane. With this launch, 6 of the 9 planes are in use. SpaceSail may want to augment batch 2 due to the majority of those satellites failing to reach their operational altitudes.

Constellation Summary:

– Of 108 Qianfan satellites on orbit, 70 have reached their operational altitudes of 1,069kms.

• Batch 1 (60379-60396) (launched 6 Aug 2024) : 17 of 18 satellites have raised their average altitude to 1,068.9km where they continue to operate. Qianfan 7 (60385) has not maneuvered and may be inoperable.
• Batch 2 (61552-61569) (launched 15 Oct 2024): 3 of 18 satellites (Qianfan 29, 30 & 32) have reached their operational altitude of 1,068.9km.
• Batch 3 (62238-62255) (launched 5 Dec 2024): 16 of 18 satellites have reached their operational altitude. Qianfan 39 & 42 appear to be struggling.

• Batch 4 (62785-62802)(launched 23 Jan 2025) : 18 of 18 satellites have reached their operational altitude of 1,068.9km.
• Batch 5 (63159-63176) (launched 11 Mar 2025): 16 of 18 satellites have reached their operational altitude. Qianfan 77 & 83 appear to be struggling.
• Batch 6 (launched 17 Oct 2025): orbital information pending.

13 Oct 2025: China launched a Long March-2D with the Shiyan-31 (65945) satellite from Jiuquan. According to official sources, the satellite entered the preset orbit successfully and “will be mainly used to verify new optical imaging technologies”. The launch was unusual in that China did not release advance notice to airmen (NOTAMs) as is their normal procedure. Launch Video. Watch LM-2D first stage bomb China.

– China launched SY-31 into an 80° inclined orbit with an apogee of 510.5km and a perigee of 494.7kms. This is not a sun-synchronous orbit typically used for optical imaging satellites.

• Typical Sun-synchronous orbits around Earth are about 600–800 km in altitude and inclinations of around 98°.

– SY-31 is in a unique orbit for Chinese imagery satellites. I could find no other imaging satellites with an 80° inclination. For example the Gaofen-11 satellites (believed to be high resolution optical earth observation satellites) are inclined 97.5° with a lower average altitude of 490-495km.

– China has launched a significant number of Shiyan satellites in 2025. With the SY-31 launch they surpassed their 2022 satellite total. Here is the Shiyan launch history going back to 2021:

• 2021: 5 launches / 6 satellites
• 2022: 7 launches / 11 satellites
• 2023: 4 launches / 7 satellites
• 2024: 2 launches / 4 satellites
• 2025*: 5 launches / 12 satellites (through Oct)

-Per Andrew Jones: “outside analysts believe Shiyan satellites are used to trial new systems such as sensors, communications subsystems and environmental instruments, forming part of China’s efforts to validate new space technologies in orbit.”

23 Oct 2025: China launched a Long March-5B with the TJS-20 satellite (66142) from Wenchang. For only the third time China used an extended fairing for this launch, the only other 2 launches to use such a fairing were the GEO imager Yaogan-41 (58582) and TJS-11 (59020) (mission unknown). Specifically, the extended fairing has a standard 5.2m diameter5.2m but a height of 18.5m compared with the standard 12.3m. According to official sources, the satellite entered the planned orbit and will be “mainly used to verify multi-band and high-speed satellite communication technology”. This mission statement is identical to the one China released after the TJS-11 launch…it is also identical with several other TJS satellites (see next article). TJS-20 will likely spend the next 7-10 days in Geosynchronous Transfer Orbit. More analysis to follow pending orbit determination. Launch Video.

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20 Oct 2025: China repositioned TJS-15 (King of the West) (63157) 0.3° to the east (94.1° to 94.4°). The maneuvers occurred from 11-30 September and increased the point of closest approach (POCA) with USA 315 (SBIRS GEO 5) (48618) from ~112km to nearly 400km. The other three kings, TJS-16 (King of the East) (63397), and TJS-17 (King of the North) (63524) and TJS-19 (King of the South) (63924) remain in their previous positions as reported in the 31 Aug 2025 edition of the Flash. The mission of these satellites remains unknown. China announced all four had the identical mission and would be “mainly used to verify multi-band and high-speed satellite communication technology.”

– China reduced TJS-15’s SMA ~13km from 11-30 Sep 2025. The maneuver initiated a slow eastward drift which ceased in early October when China increased TJS-15’s SMA ~13km to rejoin the GEO belt.

• There were no observations in the catalog between 11-30 Sep making precise maneuver analysis impossible (at least for me).

-China also made minor plane adjustments and reduced TJS-15’s inclination from 0.1° to 0.0°

– Unknown if the intent of TJS-15’s maneuvers were to increase distance with USA 315. Post maneuver the point of closest approach between the two satellites increased from 112km to 392km. (see graphic right)

24 Oct 2025: When last we checked in on the YG-36 05 and YG-39 01-05 triplets, both the Lead and Trail1 satellites had increased their average altitudes (SMA) from just under 500km to ~520km. Chinese space operators did not increase the SMA for any of the related Trail2 satellites. As a result, the previously carefully maintained satellite triplet formations quickly devolved with the Lead and Trail1 satellites maintaining their relative positions from one another while the Trail2 satellites were left in lower orbits with shorter orbital periods and a different RAAN precession rate. Nearly 6 months later China has again adjusted the SMAs for Lead and Trail1 satellites for YG-36 05 (57452/57454), YG-39 01 (57731/57728), YG-39 02 (57889/57890), YG-39 03 (57990/57988) and YG-39 05 (58558/58559). All 8 satellites increased their SMA between 14-17 October. The maneuvers were relatively small compared to the ~20km boost in April, the average SMA increase was only 5.5km. Chinese space operators were very precise, after the maneuvers Lead and Trail1 satellites had an average SMA variance of just 320m. As a result, the Lead and Trail1 satellites will maintain their relative distance from one another. While China has not maneuvered any of the Trail2 satellites associated with these formations above 500km, they are continuing to maintain their previous orbits and I assume operate independently from their Lead and Trail1 siblings. As of 24 Oct 2025 there were no maneuvers for YG-39 04 in the publicly available catalog.

2 September 2025: Kratos Space released their Annual Threat Briefing highlighting cyber threats to space systems for 2025. In 2025, the cyber threat landscape targeting the space sector expanded sharply, driven by both traditional attack methods and escalating geopolitical tensions. While novel threats draw attention, most incidents relied on well-known tactics such as Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks, ransomware, and credential theft—underscoring persistent vulnerabilities in space-linked networks and supply chains.

• 117 cyber incidents (Jan–Aug 2025) — up 118% from 2024.
• Attacks included DDoS, ransomware, and access-broker breaches.
• Attribution challenges due to overlap among space, defense, aerospace, and telecom sectors.
• Espionage groups: Salt Typhoon, Void Blizzard, Bitter APT exploiting cross-sector links.
• Geopolitical conflicts (Russia–Ukraine, Israel–Iran) driving cyber escalation.
• Hacktivists launched defacements, data theft, and VSAT attacks.
• Goal: Disrupt operations and erode trust in space and defense systems.

Cyber threats to the space sector are accelerating in scale and sophistication, blending espionage, criminal, and ideological motives that directly challenge global space resilience.

22 Oct 2025: A 2025 report from Military Aerospace Electronics notes Chinese and Russian directed-energy research and fielding point to growing space-focused capabilities. Specifically the report notes efforts using lasers and high-power microwaves (HPM) to threaten or protect space systems, harden on-orbit electronics, and enable precision, long-range effects from space or against space sensors. Excerpts below.

• Power, beam, and thermal advances: Improvements in power scaling, beam control, and thermal management are making directed energy weapons (DEWs)/lasers progressively viable for space platforms.
• Hardened on-orbit electronics: Research targets electronics that can survive HPM and other directed-energy effects — for both defensive protection of friendly satellites and offensive effects against adversary payloads.
• Operational counterspace systems: The Russian Peresvet program demonstrates explicit development of lasers for sensor and satellite disruption, indicating operational intent to target space assets.
• Phased-array HPM designs: The Chinese phased-array HPM design enables precise, multi-target engagements, making it suitable for space platforms and architectures well-suited for space or space-to-ground employment.
• Engineering reliability breakthroughs: Efficient, durable power-divider designs and sustained full-power firings point toward repeatable, mission-compatible DEW operation in space cycles.
• Operational testing & combat lessons: Real-world testing and early combat use accelerate tactics, testing requirements, and countermeasure development (spectrum management, attribution, and targeting rules). Ex. The Russian Peresvet system demonstrates an intent to use lasers for sensor and satellite disruption.
• Spectrum & survivability tradeoffs: Deploying DEWs in and against space systems pushes design priorities toward redundancy, autonomous failover, resilient communications, and new survivability standards.