10 Nov 2025: China launched a Long March-12 with 9 SatNet LEO (Guowang) Group 13 satellites from the Hainan Commercial Space Launch Site near Wenchang. According to official sources, the satellites entered the preset orbit successfully. This was the sixth Guowang launch to 50° inclination. To date 4 of the launches have use the LM-8A and the remaining two used LM-12. All launches have carried 9 satellites to orbit. It appears China intends to have 30° RAAN differential between their 50° inclined orbits, identical to the spacing of their 86.5° orbits. This will become more apparent as the Groups reach their operating altitude of 1,149.3km. Interestingly, the Group 13 satellites initial altitude is nearly 100km less than that of Group 7 (which also used the LM-12). Could be an indication of larger satellites in Group 13 (or at least more mass). Launch Video.

– With the Group 13 launch there are now 104 satellites in the operational LEO Guowang constellation (see graphics & tables). Additionally, there are 3 Guowang satellites in GEO and China has launched 18 Guowang test satellites.

– China is building out the Guowang constellation with orbits inclined either 50.0° or 86.5°. Currently there are 54 satellites in 6 50.0° orbital planes and 50 satellites in 6 86.5° orbital planes. See Table.

– Summary of Guowang Operational Launches

• Group 1 (16 Dec 2024): 10 sats on LM-5B. Orbit inclined 86.5°
• Group 2 (11 Feb 2025): 9 sats on LM-8A. Orbit inclined 50.0°
• Group 3 (28 Apr 2025): 10 sats on LM-5B. Orbit inclined 86.5°
• Group 4 (5 Jun 2025): 5 sats on LM-6A. Orbit inclined 86.5° (co-planar with Group 9)
• Group 5 (27 Jul 2025): 5 sats on LM-6A. Orbit inclined 86.5°
• Group 6 (30 Jul 2025): 9 sats on LM-8A. Orbit inclined 50.0°
• Group 7 (4 Aug 2025): 9 sats on LM-12. Orbit inclined 50.0°.
• Group 8 (13 Aug 2025): 10 sats on LM-5B. Orbit inclined 86.5°
• Group 9 (17 Aug 2025): 5 sats on LM-6A. Orbit inclined 86.5° (co-planar with Group 4)
• Group 10 (25 Aug 2025): 9 sats on LM-8A. Orbit inclined 50.0°.
• Group 11 (27 Sep 2025): 5 sats on LM-6A. Orbit inclined 86.5°.
• Group 12 (16 Oct 2025): 9 sats on a LM-8A. Orbit inclined 50.0°
• Group 13 (10 Nov 2025): 9 sats on a LM-12. Orbit inclined 50.0°

– Observations

• For the 86.5° inclined orbits (Groups 01, 03, 04, 08, 09 & 11) the operating SMA is 1,167.9km. It appears the intended RAAN separation is ~30° between planes. Group 11 filled the remaining orbital plane on 27 Sep 2025 .
• Group 09’s 5 satellites are co-planar with the 5 Group 04 satellites. China’s initial deployment appears to be 10 satellites per 86.5° orbital plane. Expect the next 86.5° launch to augment the Group 05 or Group 11 satellites. (see graphic)
• The 50° orbital planes have 9 satellites and a standard operating altitude of 1,149.3km. The Groups that have reached this SMA (2, 6, & 10) are separated by 30° RAAN offset. Groups 7, 12 & 13 continue to raise their altitudes.

– Deployment Status (all data as of 22 Nov 2025)

• 86.5° Orbits (target SMA 1,167.9km)
  • Group 1 reached operating altitude in 110 days.
  • Group 3 reached operating altitude in 34 days.
  • Group 4 reached operating altitude in 106 days.
  • Group 5 reached operating altitude in 58 days.
  • Group 8 reached operating altitude in 32 days.
  • Group 9 reached operating altitude in 52 days.
  • Group 11 reached operating altitude in 54 days.

• 50.0° inclined orbits (target SMA 1,149.3km)
  • Group 2 reached operating altitude in 77 days
  • Group 6 reached operating altitude in 103 days.
  • Group 7 continue to increase their SMA. They paused at ~907.8km for 3 weeks but have resumed maneuvers to increase SMA. They are currently at ~1,130km.

• • Group 10 reached their operating altitude on 19 Nov 2025. (86 days)
  • Group 12 started at an altitude of ~873km and have begun to increase their altitudes with most reaching ~930km.
  • Group 13 started at an altitude of 803km. This is nearly 100km lower than the Group 7 satellites which were also launched on a LM-12.

Editor’s Comment: The Guowang LEO constellation is beginning to take shape. All of the 86.5° satellites have reached their operating altitude of 1,167.9km and 50% of the 50.0° satellites have reached their operating altitude of 1,149.3km. In both cases the planes are separated by 30° RAAN. I expect the next Guowang launches to head to the 86.5° orbit planes currently occupied by Group 5 and Group 11 to bring the total number of satellites in those planes to 10 and match the other 4x 86.5° orbital planes.

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19 Nov 2025: China launched a LM-2C with the Shijian-30 A, B and C satellites (66545, 66546, & 66547) from Jiuquan. According to official sources, the satellites were deployed into the intended orbits and “will be mainly used for space environment exploration and related technology verification”. Launch Video.

– All three satellites are in 51.8° inclined orbits. As of 22 Nov their average altitudes varied slightly between 519.6-520.6km as China likely intends to increase their orbital spacing in the near term (recall 10:1 rule!)

– At their current RAAN and inclination the SJ-30 satellites are nearly co-planar with dozens of SpaceX Starlink satellites.

-The SJ-30 satellites are orbiting about 25km lower than the 547.2km average altitude maintained by many of the Starlink satellites.

– Per SBMS query there is only one Chinese satellite nearly co-planar with SJ-30…Geesat-4 09 (65127). Geesat-4 09 is inclined 50.0° and has an average altitude of 700km.

– As is normal for the Shijian family of satellites, China has not released any information on mission or capabilities of the SJ-30 trio.

– At their current average altitudes the SJ-30s will have a slightly shorter orbital period than their Starlink counterparts and will frequently pass underneath them.

– In 2024 China released a report that specifically referenced capabilities against Starlink communications. Chinese officials have frequently emphasized the need to neutralize or eliminate these satellites if they threaten national security.

– Starlink has proven particularly resistant to electronic countermeasures (I’m looking at you Russia). For an excellent analysis of the difficulties Starlink presents to Electronic Warfare operations please take a look at James Spreit’s 8 Feb 2024 report.

21 Nov 2025: China launched a LM-3B with the TJS-21 satellite from the Xichang. According to official sources, the satellite entered the planned orbit successfully and “will be mainly used for satellite communication, radio and television, data transmission and other services, as well as for conducting related technical tests and verifications.” Per (the most awesome) Jonathan McDowell’s post, “TJS 21 cataloged in 51° elliptical transfer orbit and is likely heading to a Molniya orbit.” If this proves to be the case look for TJS-21 to synchronize its orbit with SY-10 02 (54878, launched in 2022) which is also in a Molniya (or Highly Elliptical Orbit ). In addition to SY-10 02, China has 2 other satellites in HEO: SY-10 01 (49258, launched in 2021) and TJS-13 (62188, launched in 2024). All of China’s HEO satellites launched on LM-3Bs from Xichang. China synchronized the orbits of TJS-13 and SY-10 01 so that both reach their apogee over the northern hemisphere at about the same time. If China does the same for TJS-21 and SY-10 02 this will provide them continuous dual satellite coverage of the Northern Hemisphere. Simultaneous missile tracking by multiple satellites provides for greater accuracy and confidence levels when performing the missile warning mission. More to follow as China maneuvers TJS-21 into its operational orbit. See previous Flash for additional background. Launch Video.

November 2025: In early November 2025, a series of electronic interference events highlighted potential threats in Eastern Europe and the Baltic region. On November 2, a “mass AIS spoof event” was detected, stretching from Bornholm to the mid-Gulf of Finland. For about 30 minutes, hundreds or thousands of false AIS messages flooded public tracking services, with a large portion “masquerading as military vessels”. These false signals were characterized as a “deliberate, coordinated attempt” to inject fabricated data, as they lacked names, IMO numbers, or movement tracks and used dead or decommissioned MMSIs. Analysis indicates the incident was not a glitch but an attack that compromised a single AIS base station in Finland, pushing false data to multiple online services at once. Although it affected only web displays—not live maritime receivers—it showed how exploiting a single ground station can produce a large-scale information operation.

– GPS World’s journalist Jesse Khalil explains, “According to confidential sources, a covert Russian military installation in the Królewiec region… is responsible for GPS interference affecting the Baltic states and the Gulf of Finland.”

– Khalili goes on to explain, “According to confidential sources, the facility’s primary mission is to monitor satellites and NATO communications, intending to undermine allied intelligence operations. “

– “Documents obtained by Delfi indicate that the base, located in Pioniersk, is part of Russia’s ‘Tobol’ electronic warfare network.”

– Further reporting indicates “High GPS jamming” was observed over the Pechora Kamenka former air base in Russia, prompting public speculation about whether this base had been “reactivated”.

– GPS World’s journalist Tracy Cozzens also reported in June that Danish News outlets were reporting “In the Gulf of Finland, ships were disappearing from radar and Russian fighter jets were traveling through NATO airspace.”

– 13 member states of the EU have called on the European Commission to respond to the significant increase in GNSS interference:

• Lithuania: Mar ‘24: 556 to Jan ‘25 1185 cases (+113%)
• Latvia: Oct ‘24: 790 to Jan ’25 1288 cases (+63%)
• Poland: Oct’ 24: 1908 to Jan ‘25 2732 cases (+43%)

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14 November 2025: BBC reporter Joe Tidy states that Anthropic reported uncovering a sophisticated hacking campaign in which threat actors—believed with high confidence to be linked to a Chinese state-sponsored group—used its AI model, Claude, to automate parts of an espionage operation. Hackers posed as cybersecurity professionals and leveraged the model to generate code, build tools, and string together tasks that enabled them to breach unnamed organizations, extract data, and filter it for valuable information. While Anthropic says the attackers have been banned and the affected entities notified, cybersecurity experts caution that the company’s claims lack verifiable evidence and may be overstated. The broader cybersecurity industry remains divided on the accurate scale of AI-enabled attacks, noting that current AI tools still struggle with reliability and autonomy.

– From Joe Tidy’s BBC article:

• AI-assisted hacking: Attackers used Anthropic’s Claude to automate tasks in a multi-step cyber-espionage campaign targeting the tech, financial, chemical, and government sectors.
• Suspected state actor involvement: Anthropic claims ‘high confidence’ that a Chinese state-sponsored group conducted the campaign, though details remain undisclosed.
• Operational success—yet limitations: The AI reportedly helped breach organizations and sift data, but also made errors (e.g., generating fake credentials), highlighting limits to fully autonomous attacks.
• Skepticism from experts: Cybersecurity researchers question Anthropic’s claims due to a lack of verifiable threat intelligence and warn against overhyping AI-driven hacking.
• OpenAI research: Previous research suggests cyberactors, such as Aquatic Panda (China), Salmon Typhoon (China), and Crimson Sandstorm (Iran), use OpenAI tools to query open-source information and coding tasks.
• Social Engineering to Bypass Safeguards: A Google Threat Intelligence report dated 5 Nov 2025 revealed that “threat actors are adopting social engineering-like pretexts in their prompts to bypass AI safety guardrails. We observed actors posing as students in a ‘capture-the-flag’ competition or as cybersecurity researchers to persuade Gemini to provide information that would otherwise be blocked, enabling tool development.”

Potential risks to space operations: AI-assisted cyberattacks could target satellite command networks and ground stations, increasing the risk of unauthorized access, data manipulation, service disruption, or loss of spacecraft control in an already high-stakes, high-dependency domain.

12 Nov 2025: Significant solar activity caused the delay of the second New Glenn launch on 12 Nov. Seemed like a good opportunity to take a look at some space weather (and also post some amazing photos of the Northern Lights)! Watch Video.

– From Space.com

• “The (New Glenn) mission, and its delay, come at a particularly volatile time for Earth’s star. As the current period of solar activity ramps up, our home planet, too, has experienced some significant interactions between the atmosphere and incoming space weather.”
• “One of the most energetic sunspot groups of the current solar cycle, AR4274, recently released a powerful G4 coronal mass ejection straight toward Earth. Its impact caused widespread aurora overnight Tuesday (Nov. 11), and led to New Glenn’s subsequent delay.”
• “Coronal mass ejections (CMEs) are large expulsions of plasma and magnetic field from the sun’s atmosphere — the corona.”
• “Compared to solar flares — bursts of electromagnetic radiation that travel at the speed of light, reaching Earth in just over 8 minutes — CMEs travel at a more leisurely pace, relatively speaking. At their highest speeds of almost 1,900 miles per second (3,000 kilometers per second), CMEs can reach Earth in about 15 to 18 hours whilst slower CMEs traveling around 155 mi/s (250 km/s) can take several days to arrive, according to the Space Weather Prediction Center of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA).”
• “These relatively slower travel times are useful as they give us more time to prepare for such an arrival. CMEs can wreak havoc with power grids, telecommunication networks and orbiting satellites and expose astronauts to dangerous doses of radiation. Conversely, CMEs are a welcomed visitor for skywatchers worldwide as they can trigger impressive aurora displays that are visible at latitudes beyond their “normal” polar range.”

From: Beauty of Earth Post

– “The Sun just fired off its strongest solar flare of 2025—an eruption so intense that it may light up half the United States with rare auroras tonight.”

• “A massive X5.1-class solar flare burst from sunspot AR4274 on November 11, marking the most energetic solar event of the year and the strongest since October 2024.”
• “Detected at 5:04 am EST by observatories like NASA’s Solar Dynamics Observatory and tracked by NOAA’s Space Weather Prediction Center, this flare unleashed an immense surge of X-rays and ultraviolet radiation. These high-energy particles triggered R3-level radio blackouts across Europe and Africa, disrupting communications on Earth’s sunlit side.”
• “But the drama doesn’t end there. The flare was swiftly followed by three powerful coronal mass ejections (CMEs), vast clouds of solar plasma racing toward Earth. NOAA predicts the third CME—the fastest and most energetic—will strike on November 12, possibly merging with its predecessors to amplify geomagnetic storms in a phenomenon known as a ‘Cannibal CME.’”
• “This could push auroras as far south as Northern California and Alabama, and raise the threat of G4-level geomagnetic disturbances—strong enough to impact power grids, GPS signals, and satellite operations.”
• “What makes this event unique is not just its scale, but its timing: it signals the fiery peak of Solar Cycle 25, offering scientists real-time data on solar maximum and the Sun’s capacity to disrupt our technological world.”

• “In 1859, the Carrington Event — a colossal solar storm triggered by a CME — resulted in aurora displays observed near tropical latitudes over Cuba, the Bahamas, Jamaica, El Salvador, and Hawaii, according to NASA Science.”
• “The Carrington Event in 1859 caused worldwide telegraph system failures. According to History.com there were even reports of operators receiving electric shocks and sparks showering from telegraph machines, setting papers ablaze. In 1989, a CME accompanied a solar flare that hit Earth, plunging the entire province of Quebec, Canada, into an electrical blackout that lasted 12-hours, according to a NASA statement. The event cost Quebec’s utility company Hydro-Quebec at least $10 million in damages. “
• “GPS systems are particularly vulnerable to disturbances in the ionosphere and GPS coordinates have been known to stray by tens of feet during a CME event. The disruption occurs because GPS uses radio signals to relay information between a satellite and a ground receiver. The radio signal passes through the ionosphere layer containing charged plasma that bends the path of the GPS signal in a similar fashion to lens bending light, according to NOAA’s Space Weather Prediction Center. Normally, GPS systems can compensate for this bending of the radio signal, leaving the accuracy of GPS unaffected. However, during a CME event, the ionosphere can be so severely disturbed that the GPS models cannot keep track of such changes and receivers can no longer calculate an accurate position.