Issue 136

China’s ambitions in the Spratly Islands: Upgrades 2024-2025

By Dr. Larissa Beavers Asia Times reporter Gabriel Honrada states that between 2024 and 2025, China upgraded its Spratly Island outposts into an integrated electronic warfare and sensing network, deploying AI-enabled, networked radars, shipborne sensors, and resilient data-fusion architectures. The Asia Maritime…

By Dr. Larissa Beavers

Asia Times reporter Gabriel Honrada states that between 2024 and 2025, China upgraded its Spratly Island outposts into an integrated electronic warfare and sensing network, deploying AI-enabled, networked radars, shipborne sensors, and resilient data-fusion architectures. The Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative states these upgrades allowed PLA forces to resist advanced U.S. jamming, maintain radar tracking, and operate more aggressively in contested environments, with direct implications for U.S. space-enabled operations.

  • Installation of new facilities on Fiery Cross, Mischief, and Subi reefs is likely to support vehicle-deployed EW and ISR operations.
  • Installation of “at least six paved areas arrayed with fixed monopole antennas” across Fiery Cross, Mischief, and Subi reefs, optimized for unobstructed maritime line-of-sight coverage.
  • Antenna sites support groups of mobile EW/sensing vehicles—likely covering different EM bands—with camouflage and dedicated sheltering added by 2025, indicating sustained, multi-band EW operations.
  • Mischief Reef uniquely integrates five EW vehicles on linked pads with hardwired connections, while Subi Reef arrays connect to legacy EW sites and point-defense towers, indicating deeper infrastructure integration.
  • Construction of nine earth-fortified emplacements on Mischief Reef (2023), indicating preparation for concealed, road-mobile weapon deployments.
  • Covered positions suggest flexibility to host artillery, rocket systems, or vehicle-mounted point-defense weapons while denying external observation.
  • “A pair of matching radomes was completed on opposite sides of Subi Reef in early 2025.”
  • While focused on EM dominance, China is expanding support facilities for potential kinetic roles.
  • China’s base upgrades prioritize unmatched ISR and EM control over the SCS, supporting peacetime enforcement and wartime spectrum contestation.




Spratly Islands reporting since 2020 on potential impact to U.S. Space Operations:

  • Space-enabled warfare denial: AMTI states China is positioning the Spratly Islands to disrupt U.S. dependence on GPS, SATCOM, and satellite-linked ISR, thereby directly affecting space-to-force integration.
  • Ground-based counterspace support: Dr. Fumiko Sasaki author for the Journal of Indo-Pacific affairs claims island-based EW systems complement China’s counterspace strategy.
  • Resilient kill-web architecture: CGSR claims integrated maritime and island sensors mirror PLA concepts for space-domain resilience—distributed sensing, data fusion, and redundancy under jamming.
  • Submarine bastion shielding tied to space denial: AMTI states that EW and surveillance coverage in the Spratlys helps mask SSBN movements while complicating U.S. space-based maritime domain awareness.
  • Cross-domain escalation leverage: Research at Air University suggests China can impose effects on U.S. air, maritime, and space systems below the threshold of kinetic conflict, thereby increasing ambiguity and enhancing control over escalation.
  • Exploiting U.S. space-EW integration gaps: CSIC notes that Chinese advances expose U.S. vulnerabilities in training and readiness for operations when space services are degraded or denied.