Issue 16

01 Flash Archive · Members Only

Russia preparing to sign MOU with China

Russia was preparing to sign an MOU with China to cooperate on a vision for an international lunar research station, part of a broader trend toward closer Russia-China space cooperation.

Author Greg Gillinger Published February 28, 2021

17 Feb: Russia is preparing to sign a memorandum of understanding with China to cooperate on a vision for an international lunar research station.

– “The date to sign the MoU has not been determined yet and is currently discussed with the Chinese partners,” Roscosmos said. An Order of the Government of the Russian Federation relating to the move was published online Feb. 11.

– The project appears to consist of Chinese, Russian and potentially other nations contributing their own, discrete spacecraft.

– The International Lunar Research Station (ILRS) is believed to be a Chinese-developed vision for a robotic base at the lunar south pole. The first steps will be the upcoming Chang’e-6, -7 and -8 missions and international missions such as Russia’s Luna 27.

This MoU fits a larger trend of Russia moving into a closer orbit with China. This more formal agreement builds on existing cooperation in material science, data sharing, purchase agreements and lunar exploration. Russia has opted to not sign the Artemis accords with the US and had expressed concerns that Artemis was too “U.S.-centric.” Experts expect more and more space and lunar cooperation between Russia and China if the “United State continues its space policies and practices without any change.” Watch a related podcast here.

International Lunar Research Station concept.

Russian government order relating to the proposed China lunar-research-station MOU.

02 Flash Archive · Members Only

Chinese space station passes key review

The Tianhe core module for China’s planned space station passed a flight acceptance review on 18 February 2021, with China planning 11 missions across 2021 and 2022 to complete the complex.

Author Greg Gillinger Published February 28, 2021

18 Feb: The core module (Tianhe) for China’s planned space station passed a flight acceptance review. The LM-5 that will carry Tianhe arrived at Qinglan harbor in early Feb.

– China has not announced a timeframe for the mission. However previous Long March 5-series rocket launch campaigns have lasted around two months, indicating the launch from Wenchang can be expected around mid-to-late April. See video of China’s space station ambitions here.

– The core module, named Tianhe (“Harmony of the Heavens”), will be the main living quarters for crews of three astronauts up to six months at a time.

– Tianhe will provide power and propulsion for the whole space station. It also features a docking hub that will allow two later experiment modules to join.

China is planning 11 missions across 2021 and 2022 to complete the space station complex, including three module launches, four Tianzhou cargo ship missions and four Shenzhou crewed missions. The completed outpost is expected to be about one-fifth the mass of the International Space Station, a project from which China was barred by the United States.

Tianhe core module for China’s planned space station.

Wenchang launch-site location.

03 Flash Archive · Members Only

Op Ed: How Mars became the prize for China

A 17 February op-ed argues that Mars is a prize in China’s new space race, with competition involving both the United States and India and broader geopolitical implications.

Author Greg Gillinger Published February 28, 2021

17 Feb: Op-Ed by Steffi Paladini, “How Mars became the prize for a new space race—and why China is hellbent on winning it.”

– China is aiming to win the new space race. China is the only country to land on the Moon in about 40 years, becoming the first to soft land on its far side, as well planted a flag on lunar soil and brought samples back to Earth.

– China is not only racing the US, but India as well. India is China’s direct competitor not only in space but on Earth.

– In 2014 the Indian Mars Orbiter Mission (MOM), successfully reached Mars and is the first to make it at its maiden mission.

– India’s success is one reason why Tianwen-1 is so important for China’s status as a new space power: it’s a way to reassert its space dominance over its neighbor. Unlike India, Tianwen-1 is not the first time China attempted a mission to Mars – the prior one, Yinghuo-1 (2011), failed on launch.

– The development effort behind China’s space sector is largely government funded and military led.

– India has taken a different approach, where civilian/commercial interests have been predominant.

China considers space as a “tool of geopolitical and diplomatic competition.” It is clear that, together with cyberspace, the cosmos has become a fundamental new warfighting domain, where the US are the main — but not the only — adversary.

Op Ed: How Mars became the prize for China.

04 Flash Archive · Members Only

Russia inadvertently reveals military satellites

A 2017 Russian Ministry of Defence photograph appeared to reveal previously unknown Repei-S and Repei-V military satellite projects, with communications and SIGINT missions both discussed as possibilities.

Author Greg Gillinger Published February 28, 2021

22 Jun 2017: Russia inadvertently reveals Repei-S and Repei-V military satellites.

– On June 6, 2017 Russian Minister of Defence Sergei Shoigu visited the ISS Reshetnev satellite factory near Krasnoyarsk.

– A Russian MoD photo appears to confirm existence of previously unknown Russian military satellite.

– The ‘Repei-S’ and ‘Repei-V’ that will fly in geostationary or highly elliptical orbits…the name Repei had not previously been associated with any Russian satellite project known in open sources.

– The picture showing the Repei board was unavailable on the MoD’s website…the photograph could have been removed from the ministry’s website once it became clear that it unintentionally identified the Repei satellite.

– There has been no confirmation of Russia launching the satellites.

– The Repei mission remains unconfirmed, but there are two primary possibilities:

1) Military communications satellites. ISS Reshetnev is known to be working on next-generation military COMSATs to be deployed into highly elliptical orbits and geostationary orbits.

2) Repei-S and Repei-V may be SIGINT satellites destined for geostationary and highly elliptical orbits. This would represent an expansion of Russia’s intelligence collection capabilities in an area where Moscow’s capabilities lag behind China and the US.

– If fulfilling a SIGINT mission, the Repei satellites would join the Luch/Olimp-K which was launched in 2014. Reports indicate Luch/Olimp-K serves in a dual role: (1) electronic intelligence (ELINT), and (2) providing secure communications for government use.

The release of the photograph could represent a deliberate leak, similar to the apparently intentional leak of supposedly classified information on the development of a nuclear torpedo, the Status-6, on Russian state television in Nov 2015. However, it has so far received far less prominence in Russian media than the Status-6 leak. In addition, the photograph’s absence from the ministry’s website would support the assessment that the leak was genuinely accidental.