Issue 84

19 Oct 2023: The United States Department of Defense released its annual report to Congress on Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China for 2023. This report contains more content on China’s rapid development/deployment of space capabilities.

Overview/Doctrine: The PLA views space superiority, the ability to control the space-enabled information sphere and to deny adversaries their own space-based information gathering and communication capabilities, as critical components to conduct modern “informatized warfare.”

– Authoritative PLA sources call for the coordinated employment of space, cyberspace, and EW as strategic weapons to “paralyze the enemy’s operational system of systems” and “sabotage the enemy’s war command system of systems” early in a conflict.

Space: The PRC’s space enterprise continues to mature rapidly, and Beijing has devoted significant resources to growing all aspects of its space program, from military space applications to civil applications. This includes profit-generating launches, scientific endeavors, and space exploration.

– Space is a critical enabler of beyond-line-of-sight operations for deployed Chinese forces… The PRC views its ability to acquire timely, high-fidelity information as critical to its ability to execute precision strikes… depends heavily on Strategic Support Force (SSF) assets to detect, identify, target, and conduct battlefield damage assessments. The PRC emphasizes the importance of space-based surveillance capabilities in supporting precision strikes and, in 2022, continued to develop its constellation of military reconnaissance satellites that could support monitoring, tracking, and targeting of US and allied forces.

– PLA field commanders view near-real-time ISR and situational data,, plus redundant and reliable communications, as essential to streamlining decision making processes and shortening response timelines. Beijing recognizes advantages of near-space ISR capabilities and will probably seek to leverage near-space platforms to augment space-based satellite capabilities, or provide redundancy during times of crisis.

– Recent improvements to the PRC’s space-based ISR capabilities emphasize the development,

procurement, and use of increasingly capable satellites with digital camera technology as well as

space-based radar for all-weather, 24-hour coverage. These improvements increase China’s

monitoring capabilities – including observation of US aircraft carriers, expeditionary strike

groups, and deployed air wings. Space capabilities will enhance potential PLA military operations

farther from the Chinese coast. These capabilities are being augmented with electronic

reconnaissance satellites that monitor radar and radio transmissions.

Counterspace: The PRC continues to develop counterspace capabilities – including direct-ascent anti-satellite missiles, co-orbital satellites, electronic warfare, and directed-energy systems – that can contest or deny an adversary’s access to and operations in the space domain during a crisis or conflict.

– The PLA sees counterspace operations as a means to deter and counter a US intervention during a regional military conflict.

– The PRC continues to develop a variety of counterspace capabilities designed to limit or prevent an adversary’s use of space during a crisis or conflict. In addition to the development of directed energy weapons and satellite jammers, the PLA has an operational ground-based anti-satellite (ASAT) missile intended to target low-Earth orbit satellites. The PRC probably intends to pursue additional ASAT weapons capable of destroying satellites up to GEO.