Log in
subscribe
Back to the archive
Share f x in

Issue 144

08 Impact Assessment · Iran · Multi-Domain

Iran Non-Kinetic Jamming Since Feb 2026 Part 2

Iran’s non-kinetic campaign has produced measurable operational effects across navigation, communications, and the broader information environment. Disruptions to GPS and satellite-based systems have increased the risk to maritime activity while degrading both civilian and military communications capabilities. Concurrently, these actions have enabled greater control over information flow by limiting external connectivity and coordination. Supporting cyber activity has also been observed, though it remains relatively low in sophistication and is primarily focused on disruption and signaling rat

Author Greg Gillinger Published May 4, 2026
By Dr. Larissa Beavers

Iran’s non-kinetic campaign has produced measurable operational effects across navigation, communications, and the broader information environment. Disruptions to GPS and satellite-based systems have increased the risk to maritime activity while degrading both civilian and military communications capabilities. Concurrently, these actions have enabled greater control over information flow by limiting external connectivity and coordination. Supporting cyber activity has also been observed, though it remains relatively low in sophistication and is primarily focused on disruption and signaling rather than sustained effects.

Summary of Iranian Non-Kinetic Jamming Since 28 Feb – 30 Apr 2026:

Operational Effects

Navigation Denial

  • Disruption to maritime traffic and global shipping routes
  • Increased risk in high-traffic chokepoints (e.g., Strait of Hormuz)

Communications Degradation

  • Reduced the effectiveness of satellite-based internet and comms systems
  • Impact on both civilian and military users

Information Control

  • Restriction of external communications
  • Limitations of protest coordination and data flow

 

Cyber Activity (Supporting Operations)

  • Iranian-aligned actors conducted:
    • Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attacks
    • Basic reconnaissance operations
  • Targeted entities:
    • United States networks
    • Israeli networks
  • Assessment:
    • Operations were disorganized and low sophistication
    • Relied on primitive tools and techniques
    • Likely intended for:
      • Disruption
      • Signaling rather than sustained cyber effects

 

 

Cyber Dragonz Islamic Resistance

Resecurity

Recruitement Post for Islamic Resistance

Resecurity

Image produced using AI based on references noted above