Issue 123

8-20 June: As predicted in the last Flash, China maneuvered both SJ-21 (49330) and SJ-25 (62485) into proximity with one another. Both satellites continue to make minor maneuvers and the satellites have ranged in separation from <1km to >100km and it is unknown if they were able to dock with one another (docking is likely required for re-fueling). Tracking the two satellites becomes more challenging once they are within 10km of one another due to resolution limitations of ground based telescopes. COMSPOC noted that the GSSAP satellite USA 270 (41744) adjusted its orbit to remain in proximity of SJ-21/25, likely in order to monitor China’s progress in conducting the world’s first on-orbit refueling in GEO. USA 271 (41645) did not adjust its orbit and is no longer in proximity. Watch COMSPOC Video of maneuvers for all 4 satellites (SJ-21/25 & USA 270/271) from 10-13 June. Also see amazing s2a systems video of close approach. Slingshot Aerospace also put together a video of the point of closest approach. China has not publicly shared any information regarding the ongoing test/demonstration. (I’m here for you guys if you’re willing).

– Per COMSPOC Reporting (current as of 17 Jun 2025):

• SHIJIAN-21 (SJ-21) and SHIJIAN-25 (SJ-25) have been engaged in RPO activity since 11 June, while USA 270 halted its previous eastward drift to position itself within the same longitude slot occupied by the SJ pair.
• On 11 June SJ-25 approached SJ-21, coming within roughly 50 km at approximately 01:21 UTC. Following this initial approach, both satellites executed several smaller maneuvers to closely align their orbital parameters, maintaining a mean longitude slot at~128°.
• SJ-21 and SJ-25 reached their closest proximity on 13 June between approximately 11:30 UTC and 13:00 UTC, after which they separated again. As of 16 June, the inter-satellite distance had increased significantly and is now greater than 100 km.
• Given the relatively short duration (~1.5 hours) of this close encounter, we (COMSPOC) have identified three potential scenarios:
  • SJ-21 and SJ-25 successfully docked during that time period;
  • SJ-21 and SJ-25 conducted a deliberate rehearsal maneuver but did not attempt docking;
  • SJ-21 and SJ-25 initiated a docking attempt but aborted during final approach.
• It remains uncertain whether an actual docking event took place; additional observations will be required to confirm their operational activities and intentions.
• USA 271 continued drifting eastwards and is no longer maintaining proximity to the SJ-21/SJ-25 satellite pair. Conversely, USA 270 has executed several maneuvers, drifting eastward and stopping within the mean longitude slot currently occupied by SJ-21 and SJ-25.

– Reporting from the Joint Commercial Operations Cell from 17-20 Jun has noted an additional 2 maneuvers from SJ-21 and 3 maneuvers from SJ-25. The intent of the maneuvers is unclear.

Editor’s Note: SJ-21 and SJ-25 remain co-planar and continue to maneuver. If necessary, Chinese space operators will be able to attempt additional docking with minor orbital adjustments. An interesting question is what will China do with both satellites post-test. Assuming SJ-25 proves itself as a capable re-fueling platform I would expect China to place the satellite into a more populated orbital plane in order to support additional satellites…this would mean reducing its current inclination from 10.5° to 0-2°. SJ-21 is an even more interesting question. With a full fuel tank will China use the satellite again for a “debris mitigation” demonstration or place it into a more popular orbital plane in order to conduct GEO monitoring/inspection (with a proven “capture/tow” capability)? Plane changes of this magnitude are VERY rare due to the fuel expenditure required…and maybe that’s the point. With refueling capability China can increase the maneuverability of other satellites equipped to dock with SJ-25, leading to previously unseen tactics.

20 Jun: China launched a Long March-3B with the ZhongXing (ChinaSat)-9C satellite from Xichang. ZhongXing (ZX)-9C is a 5.5 ton satellite designed to provide communications services for live television broadcasts for 15 years. China Satellite Communications Co Ltd will operate the satellite and has announced its intention to use ZX-9C to replace the aging ZX-9 (33051) which was launched in 2008. Assuming this is correct, China will place ZX-9C into GEO at ~92.2°E and eventually maneuver ZX-9 into a graveyard orbit. Launch Video.

22 Jun: China continues to evolve the formations of the 15 Yaogan triplets (45 satellites) it launched between 2021-2023. While none of the triplets remain in their original configuration of Lead-Trail1-Trail2, China continues to actively maintain the orbits of at least 35 of the 45 satellites.

YG-36 05 & YG-39 01-05 (6 Triplets, 18 Satellites)

• Lead/Trail1 Satellites: China is maintaining Lead and Trail1 formations for YG-36 05 and all 5 YG-39 triplets: 1) YG-36 05C/B; 2) YG-39 01C/B; 3) YG-39 02B/C; 4) YG-39 03C/B; 5) YG-39 04C/B; & 6) YG-39 05B/C). All 12 satellites are orbiting at ~515.9km with average altitude difference between the Lead and Trail1 satellites of only ~80m. As a result, the Lead-Trail1 satellites maintain their relative positions with one another. Lead is in front of the Trail1 satellite by 4-6 minutes. (see graphics next page)
• Trail2 Satellites: The 6 Trail2 satellites are also maintaining their operational orbits near their historical average of 497km. However, they are orbiting ~19km lower than their Lead/Trail1 counterparts and are not maintaining their relative position with either of these satellites (10:1 rule). Operating at different altitudes also results in developing a RAAN offset with the Lead/Trail1 satellites. As of 22 Jun the average RAAN offset between the Trail2 satellites and Lead/Trail1 satellites is ~3.9°. This is greater than the RAAN offset China deliberately established with its older triplets (about 3.6°) and I’m beginning to wonder if China will ever bring the band back together. To do so, China will need to match the average altitudes of all 3 satellites in each triplet.

 

YG-35 01-05 & YG-36 01-04 (9 Triplets, 27 Satellites)

• Lead Satellites: China has not maneuvered any of the Lead satellites in the past 3 months. The satellites are now operating at an average altitude of 468km well below their historical average of ~497km.
• Trail1 Satellites: China continues to maintain the orbits of 8 of the 9 Trail1 satellites. All 8 are operating at an average altitude of 515.3km which above their historical average of ~497km and nearly identical to the current average altitudes of the YG-36 05 and YG-39 Lead/Trail1 satellites noted above. The one exception is YG-36 02B (54043) which last increased its average altitude in March 2025 but not to the same extent as any of the other Trail1 satellites. I suspect this satellite may have suffered an anomaly. (See Graph).
• Trail2 Satellites: China continues to maintain the orbits of all 9 Trail2 satellites. 8 of the 9 are operating at their historical average altitude of 497km. The one exception is YG-35 03A (53316) which did not maneuver from 29 Jan – 11 Nov 2024 resulting in a loss of altitude from 496.3km to 431.3km (I thought it was a goner). However, China has been slowly increasing YG-35 03A’s average altitude for the past several months and it has climbed back to 465km.

 

Editor’s Comment: None of the 15 triplets are in their original formations. China continues to maintain 6 Lead/Trail1 formations. Only 6 of the 15 Lead satellites are maintaining their orbits. China is maintaining the orbits of 14 of the 15 Trail1 satellites at ~516km. China is maintaining the orbits of 14 of the 15 Trail2 satellites at ~497km.

Historical Context: Recall that for the first 2 years these satellites remained in predictable formation with one another, with one lead satellite about 5-7 minutes ahead of the first trail satellite (Trail1) which was itself about 1-3 minutes ahead of the second trail satellite (Trail2). In the 8 April Integrity Flash I noted that China appeared to be “pulling the plug” on the first 9 triplets (YG-35 01-05 & YG-36 01-04) by raising the average altitude of only the Trail1 satellites. Then in the 4 May edition, I noticed China raised the average altitudes of both the Lead and Trail1 satellites in the remaining 6 triplets without raising the average altitude of their Trail2 counterparts. As a result none of the 15 YG-35/36/39 triplets have maintained their original formations.

18 Jun: Russia launched an Angara 5 equipped with a Briz-M upperstage from Plesetsk carrying what is believed to be a 14F166A satellite, aka Cosmos 2589 (64467). Cosmos 2589 was developed at ISS Reshetnev under a December 2017 contract from the Ministry of Defense. Research from Bart Henrdrickx links the development of the Cosmos 2589 with TsNIIKhM (aka CNIIHM Insitute). TsNIIKhM/CNIIHM has been linked to Russian inspection/anti-satellite programs. The Russian Ministry of Defense launch announcement noted the launch of multiple “satellites,” however there is currently only 1 active object identified. The Cosmos 2589 may be a large satellite platform for one or more Nivilir-like “inspectors” or “satellite killers” in GEO (see Cosmos 2519 & Cosmos 2542). This was the 5th launch of the Angara-5. Launch Video.

– Cosmos 2589 is currently in a super-synchronous orbit with an apogee of 51,111.7km and perigee of 20,269.1km. It has an inclination of 1.1°.

– These orbital values are similar to those noted in an environmental statement for the 14F166 project the Angara-5 and Briz-M in 2023.

– From Anatoly Zak:

• Russian authorities disclosed the existence of the 14K248 (Angara-5 & Briz-M) system and its 14F166A spacecraft with the publication of the environmental impact statement at the end of 2023.

• Per the environmental impact statement the orbit would have a perigee of 18,858km and an apogee of 52,728km and be inclined 1.3°. After the separation from the Briz-M in the super-synchronous orbit, the 11F166 satellite (is) expected to use its own SPD-100V low-thrust but highly efficient electric engines to boost the perigee and lower the apogee in order to reach an operational geostationary orbit (this will likely take multiple months).

– The linkage between the Nivilir and 14F166A program stems from a 2017 contract in which a Russian company, ISS Reshetnev, received a contract for a part of the work on the 14F166 satellite from Moscow-based TsNIIKhM. TsNIIKhM is known to specialize in the development of anti-satellite and inspector systems.

– Per Bart Hendrickx:

• “TsNIIKhM (developed the) 14F162 subsatellites (which) appear to be designed for close-up inspections of satellites and, if necessary, their destruction. TsNIIKhM worked on a small satellite that could perform proximity operations in geostationary orbit using astronavigation and machine vision.”
• “14F166…is a fairly heavy satellite…TsNIIKhM’s role in the project may be to build subsatellites that will be deployed from the 14F166 satellites after they reach their destination in geostationary orbit. In other words, the 14F166 satellites would serve as a launch platform for small inspection satellites, in very much the same way that the 14F150 satellites act as parent satellites for the Nivelir subsatellites.”

• “So far everything is pointing in the direction of the payload indeed being 14F166A or 14F166…these are satellites built by ISS Reshetnev on the basis of the Express-2000 platform, but there are strong signs that the project also involves the CNIIHM institute (TsNIIKhM), which has been responsible for building inspection satellites and counterspace weapons. The most plausible explanation is that the ISS Reshetnev satellite carries a CNIIHM (TsNIIKhM) subsatellite that will be released from it after it reaches geostationary orbit. This is in line with the Ministry of Defense’s launch announcement, which talked about (multiple) satellites being on board.”
• “Yet another indication that the payload is 14F166A or 14F166 comes from pictures of the roll-out. The index of the payload fairing can be identified as 14S746. This is the same fairing given in the 14F166(A) documentation. Its dimensions are 4.350×17.705 m and the mass is 2280 kg. This was the first launch that used this particular fairing.”
• “It now remains to be seen how long it will take the satellite (Cosmos 2589) to reach GEO. Two earlier Russian missions have followed this particular insertion profile via a supersynchronous transfer orbit, namely Express-80/103 in 2020 and Express-AMU3/AMU7 in 2021. Both pairs of satellites were based on the lighter Express-1000 platform. The first pair needed about six months to reach GEO (using only SPD-100V electric thrusters) and the second pair about three months (using SDP-100V thrusters and an additional SPD-140D thruster). 14F166A, using the heavier Express-2000 platform, has only SPD-100V engines for this purpose.”

Editor’s Note: This is a significant development which will require careful tracking for the foreseeable future. Russia has already proven its willingness to place suspicious LEO satellites (Cosmos 2558, 2576 and 2588) into co-planar orbits with high-value US reconnaissance satellites, and could follow similar tactics with Cosmos 2589. From reporting noted above Cosmos 2589 is a large satellite carrying an unknown number of sub-satellites manufactured by a Russian company linked to the Nivilir program. After conducting on-orbit testing (this is the first Nivilir-like capability for Russia in GEO), Russia could decide to follow a similar playbook and maneuver the Cosmos 2589 (or its successors) into plane matched orbits with select target satellites in GEO and then release a sub-satellite to hold those assets at risk.