Issue 140

Attack on GPS Spikes Amid US and Israeli War on Iran

By Dr. Larissa Beavers 2 March 2026: Matt Burgess , an author from WIRED , reports a sharp increase in GPS/GNSS interference affecting maritime traffic in the Middle East following the outbreak of the U.S.–Israeli military campaign against Iran in February 2026. More than 1,100 ships in the Gulf region experienced GPS…

By Dr. Larissa Beavers

2 March 2026: Matt Burgess, an author from WIRED, reports a sharp increase in GPS/GNSS interference affecting maritime traffic in the Middle East following the outbreak of the U.S.–Israeli military campaign against Iran in February 2026. More than 1,100 ships in the Gulf region experienced GPS or AIS disruptions, largely due to jamming and spoofing attacks that manipulated navigation signals, causing vessels to appear in false locations on tracking systems. These disruptions significantly increased the risk of collisions, navigation errors, and maritime accidents while contributing to the near halt of shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, a critical global energy chokepoint. The incident demonstrates how conflicts on Earth can directly target space-enabled services—specifically satellite-based positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT)—highlighting the vulnerability of space-derived infrastructure to electronic warfare and signaling interference.

Key Points in Burgess’ “Attack on GPS Spikes Amid US and Israeli War on Iran”:

  • The disruption of GPS signals affecting over 1,100 vessels demonstrates how space-enabled services such as PNT can be targeted during regional conflicts.
  • Interference with satellite navigation has contributed to major shipping disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz, one of the world’s most critical maritime trade routes.
  • The spike in interference reinforces the need for multi-constellation navigation, signal authentication, and spectrum protection to ensure continuity of space-enabled services during geopolitical crises.
  • GNSS interference is significantly cheaper and easier to deploy than kinetic attacks, making it an attractive tool for states seeking to deny space-enabled services without escalating to physical attacks on satellites.
  • The incident illustrates how terrestrial conflict can exploit vulnerabilities in space-based infrastructure, reinforcing the importance of resilient PNT architectures and alternative navigation methods.
  • As of 4 March, WINDWARD reports only four vessels were able to transit during the day – resulting in a 42.86% from 2 March 2026.


Attack on GPS Spikes Amid US and Israeli War on Iran

AIS positions falsely placing vessels on Iranian land due to GPS jamming detected across Gulf region
WINDWARD


Straight of Hormuz Crossings 3 March WINDWARD

Straight of Hormuz Crossings 3 March
WINDWARD