Issue 140

5 Mar 2026: As noted in the last edition of the Flash, Chinese space operators maneuvered both TJS-10 (58204) and TJS-3 (43874) in early February resulting in the two satellites heading toward one another. TJS-10 (58204) remains above the GEO belt and maintains a 1.9°/day westward drift. For its part, TJS-3 increased its SMA 81km on 27 Feb, slowing its eastward drift from ~1.3°/day to 0.2°/day. In their current orbits (as of 5 Mar) TJS-10 and TJS-3 are on course to have a point of closest approach on 20 Mar 2026 at ~1630Z over ~90.4°E longitude.

Recall that TJS-3 and TJS-10 operated in vicinity of one another during TJS-10’s first year on orbit from Nov 2023 – Nov 2024. It appears China purposefully launched TJS-10 into a co-planar orbit with TJS-3 (TJS-3 also conducted minor plane change maneuvers prior to TJS-10 launch). Comparing their current orbital parameters TJS-10 and TJS-3 remain nearly co-planar. Their inclination values are separated by only 0.001° and RAAN by 0.019°.

TJS-3’s most recent maneuver not only slowed its eastward drift, but also changed TJS-3’s eccentricity (orbit shape) to more closely match that of TJS-10. Prior to the maneuver TJS-3’s orbit had an eccentricity of 0.00006; post maneuver the eccentricity was 0.00169. TJS-10’s eccentricity is 0.00111. China has not aligned the Argument of Perigee for the two satellites, TJS-3 Arg of Perigee is 345.1° and TJS-10 is 234.0°. Looking at the two satellites at point of closest approach (assumes no further maneuvers) TJS-3 and TJS-10 will be separated by <1km in cross-track and in-track and just under 200km in radial-track.

Given the past history of these two satellites I anticipate TJS-10 will decrease its SMA prior to crossing paths with TJS-3 and position itself just to the east of TJS-3. In 2024 this distance ranged from 60-200km. We will be able to observe future maneuvers from both satellites…stay tuned!

1 Feb – 5 Mar Orbital History of TJS-10 (Left) and TJS-3 (Right)
TJS-10 Holding Steady after 3-4 Feb SMA Increase
TJS-3 Increased SMA 81km 27 Feb 2026 Remains 21km Below GEO
(celestrak.org)

5 Mar: TJS-3 and TJS-10 Current Positions and Point Of Closest Approach Projection
(saberastro.com)

Projected Point of Closest Approach 20 Mar 2026
Note Radial Distance Primary Source of Separation
(saberastro.com)

3 Mar 2026: We last updated SJ-29A/B (67302 & 67303) in the 2 Feb 2026 Flash. Recall, at that time the pair had settled into GEO at 73.0°E longitude with an inclination of 3.1°. We also noted they were joined by USA 325 (51281), one of the United States’ Geosynchronous Space Situational Awareness Program (GSSAP) satellites, which appeared to be in a favorable orbit to observe/characterize both satellites. At the time the two SJ-29 satellites were maintaining a separation of 30-70km of one another and were occasionally within 100km of USA 325.

As of 4 Mar the SJ-29-A and B continue to maintain ~50-70km absolute separation, most of this is due to in-track differences as the two satellites are nearly perfectly plane-matched. Only SJ-29B appears to have maneuvered in the past month; the satellite decreased SMA ~1km on 5 Feb and increased SMA by ~1.5km on 21 Feb. Both satellites remain IVO of 73.0° E longitude.

Based on TLE data from 28 Feb 2026 it appears USA 325 remains in the area. USA 325 has a close approach with SJ-29A as the pair travels from North to South and then has a close approach with SJ-29B as the pair travel from South to North. USA 325 has a close approach every twelve hours with one of the satellites. Close approach for SJ-29A and USA 325 occurs at ~0300Z with solar conditions favoring SJ-29A observing USA 325. Close approach between SJ-29B and USA 325 occurs 12 hours later (~1500Z), with solar conditions favoring USA 325 observing of SJ-29B. Examples: 2 Mar 2026 15:02Z SJ-29B was ~11km from USA 325 with optimal solar conditions for USA 325 to observe SJ-29B. On 4 Mar 2026 02:57Z SJ-29A was ~22km from SJ-29A with favorable solar conditions for SJ-29A to observe USA 325.

4 Mar 2026: SJ-29A orbit is just west of SJ-29B. USA 325 orbit positioned to observe both satellites with close approaches occurring every 12 hours
(saberastro.com)

4 Mar 2026: Point of Closest Approach ~22km With Optimal Lighting Conditions for SJ-29A to Observe USA 325
(saberastro.com)

2 Mar 2026: Point of Closest Approach ~11km With Optimal Lighting Conditions for USA 325 to Observe SJ-29B
(saberastro.com)

4 Mar 2026: SJ-21 (49330) and SJ-25 (62485) remain separated by ~560-640km with SJ-21 located to the east of SJ-25. The two orbits are plane-matched and the vast majority of the separation in-track. We may beginning to see a new pattern of life for both satellites. SJ-25 decreased its SMA ~5.4km on 5 Feb. About a week later, SJ-21 decreased its SMA 3.1km. On 2 Mar 2026 SJ-25 again decreased its average altitude, this time ~7.3km. It will be interesting to see if SJ-21 follows with a similar maneuver in the coming days.

SJ-21/25s’ recent maneuvers are likely station keeping and not indicative of any renewed proximity operations. The satellites remain co-planar with in-track separation. A reminder that in-track maneuvers are by far the least expensive in terms of energy (fuel). Should Chine desire to do so they could quickly and cheaply return to RPO conditions between these two satellites.

2 – 7 Mar 2026: Total/Radial/In/Cross-Track (TRIC) Plot Showing Distances Separating SJ-21 and SJ-25. Note Minimal Radial (0-10km) & Cross Track Separation (0-0.5km). In-Track Separation is 560-640km.
(saberastro.com)

4 Mar 2026: SJ-21 and SJ-25 Orbits over ~127°E
(saberastro.com)

1 Feb – 4 Mar 2026: Orbital History for SJ-21 (left) and SJ-25 (right)
(celestrak.org)

5 Mar 2026: The 9 satellites that make up the YG-43 02 (60945-60950) and YG-43 03 (61617-61619) train remain largely in formation. The one exception is YG-43 02A (60945) which last maneuvered in late-April 2025 and is now orbiting nearly 50km lower than the other 8 satellites. The remaining 8 satellites are maneuvering and remaining within 0.5km in average altitude (SMA). As a result they are closely maintaining their relative positions with one another. China deployed its second series of Yaogan-43 satellites in two batches, the first consisted of 6 YG-43 02 satellites launched on a LM-4B on 3 Sep 2024. The second group consisting of 3 YG-43 03 satellites launched on a LM-2C on 23 Oct 2024. China maneuvered the two groups into a co-planar formation with 02 and 03 satellites forming a single train.

4 Mar 2026: 8 of 9 YG-43 02/03 Satellites Maintaining Orbits and Relative Positions with One Another
(spacemap42.com)

It Appears Yaogan-43 02A Has Gone Leeroy Jenkins
(spacemap42.com)

23 Dec 2025: The US Department of Defense/War released its annual report to Congress on military and security developments involving the People’s Republic of China. The document highlights China’s strategic goals, military modernization, defense spending, global influence operations, and coercive tactics. The report emphasizes China’s ambition to achieve a “world-class” military by 2049, with intermediate goals set for 2027 and 2035. Key areas of focus include Taiwan, the South China Sea, defense spending, technological advancements, and global military presence. China’s military strategy is centered on “active defense,” combining strategic defense with offensive action. Specific to space, the report notes China has significantly expanded its space capabilities, focusing on satellite communications (SATCOM), intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), space exploration, and counterspace operations.

– Space Launch Capabilities: ?

• China is increasing its space launch capacity to support military, civil, and commercial goals, including reducing costs and sustaining low Earth orbit (LEO) megaconstellations. ?
• In 2024, China conducted successful tests of reusable space launch vehicles (SLVs) and sea-based launches, which improve efficiency and reduce costs. ?
• New launch sites, such as the Hainan Commercial Launch Complex, are being developed to support additional launches. ?

– Satellite Communications (SATCOM): ?

• China launched the first batch of satellites for the Xingwang (China SatNet/Guowang) megaconstellation and the Qianfan megaconstellation (G60 Starlink), enhancing SATCOM resilience and enabling global coverage. ?
• These constellations will improve communication, navigation, and data connectivity for deployed PLA forces. ?

– ISR Satellites: ?

• China launched 67 ISR-capable satellites in 2024, bringing its total to over 500. ? These satellites enhance China’s ability to monitor U.S. and allied military assets and provide targeting support for long-range operations. ?

– Space Exploration: ?

• China continues to pursue ambitious space exploration goals, including the establishment of the International Lunar Research Station (ILRS) and plans for a crewed lunar landing by 2030.
• In 2024, China successfully retrieved samples from the far side of the moon using the Chang’e-6 lunar probe and launched satellites to support lunar exploration. ?

– Counterspace Capabilities: ?

• China is developing terrestrial and space-based antisatellite (ASAT) systems, including ground-based ASAT missiles, on-orbit capabilities, electronic warfare (EW), and directed energy weapons (DEW). ?
• PLA counterspace operations include cyberattacks targeting U.S. satellite networks and ground-based jammers to disrupt satellite communications. ?

– Space-Based Early Warning Systems: ?

• China expanded its space-based early warning architecture with new infrared satellites capable of detecting intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launches within seconds. ?
• Ground-based large phased-array radars complement space-based systems for missile detection and early warning. ?

6 Mar 2026: Russia launched a Proton-M, with a DM-03 upper stage, with the Elektro-L No.5 (67756) meteorological satellite from the Baikonur Cosmodrome, on 12 February 2026. Elektro-L No.5 is the fifth hydrometeorological (weather) geostationary satellite. Also on board was the Islamic Republic of Iran’s first (and perhaps final) geostationary satellite, Jam-e Jam-1 (67757). Aldoria published a 7-page report on Jam-e Jam-1 and their tracking of the satellite on LinkedIn. Per Aldoria’s report, Jam e-Jam “serves as a broadcast backhaul: routing high-quality video feeds from Tehran to terrestrial transmitters across the country. The explicit goal is to end Iran’s reliance on capacity leased from foreign satellites (Intelsat, Eutelsat) which remain exposed to the risk of Western sanctions.” Launch Video.

-Jam-e Jam appears to be settling into GEO at ~34°E:

• More from Aldoria: “Iran held orbital rights at 34° East registered with the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), which were on the verge of expiring…Jam-e Jam-1 arrived just in time to preserve them. The 34° East slot provides coverage over the Middle East, Central Asia, parts of Eastern Europe and Africa.”
• Per Bart Hendrickx: it appears “that Jam-e Jam-1 was built largely by the Russians (that is AO Reshetnev) and that only the two follow-on satellites will incorporate a significant amount of Iranian-built hardware.”

– Elektro-L No. 5 orbited 212km above GEO and drifting west 2.68°/day until 6 Mar when the satellite lowered its SMA and decreased its westward drift to 0.1°/day. We anticipate Elektro-L No 5 to settle into GEO at 76°E longitude.

• More from B Hendrickx: “This is consistent with it heading for a parking spot at 76°E (the position indicated on the payload fairing for this mission). So we should see Elektro-L N°3 move away from that point in the coming days. Logic suggests it in turn will be stationed at 14.5°W, currently still occupied by Elektro-L N°2, which will probably be retired.”

Proton-M Heads to Launch Pad
(nasaspaceflight.com)

Elektro-L No 5 Assembly/Test
(nasaspaceflight.com)

5 Mar 2026: Positions of Jam-e Jam-1 & Elektro-L No 5 (saberastro.com)

6 Mar 2025: Russia continues to maneuver Cosmos 2589 (64467) closer to a circular Geosynchronous Orbit. Russia has been regularly increasing the satellite’s perigee and decreasing its apogee resulting in a decrease in eccentricity from 0.3649 in Nov 2025 to 0.1095 in early March. During this time Cosmos 2589’s perigee has increased 10,780km and its apogee has decreased 10,772km. If Russia maintains Cosmos 2589’s current maneuver pattern the satellite will have an eccentricity of <0.01 on ~17 Apr 2026. Once Russia circularizes 2589’s orbit the satellite will have joined the Geosynchronous belt and be able to conduct inspection missions similar to the US GSSAP or Chinese SY-12 satellites.

For its part, Cosmos 2590 (a sub-satellite from Cosmos 2589 released in late-June 2025) remains in a Geosynchronous Highly Eccentric Orbit. It’s perigee is 20,359km and apogee is 51,216km. Its eccentricity is currently 0.3659 compared with 0.3665 back in early December 2025.

Editor’s Comments: It appears Russia conducted a final operations test of Cosmos 2590 from 2-14 Nov 2025 having the satellite remain <2km from Cosmos 2589 for extended periods of time. With testing objectives met (an assumption) Russia has moved to a new phase of operations with Cosmos 2589. I expect Cosmos 2589 to continue to lower its apogee and raise its perigee for the next 1-2 months, eventually circularizing into Geosynchronous Orbit. Several questions remain: 1) how will Cosmos 2589 operate in GEO…will it continuously roam similar to China’s SY-12 inspector satellites or drift to specific target satellites and then remain in proximity for several months, similar to Russia’s Luch/Olymp; 2) Will Cosmos 2589 release additional sub-satellites once in GEO; 3) will Cosmos 2590 release its own sub-satellite/projectile as we’ve noted with Nivelir satellites in LEO; and 4) will Russia maneuver or conduct further testing with Cosmos 2590. I think we have a reasonable chance to answer all of these questions in the coming months. Stay Tuned!

12 Nov 2025 – 4 Mar 2026: Orbital History of Cosmos 2589 (left) & Cosmos 2590 (right)
Cosmos 2589 Increased Perigee 10,780km & Decreased Apogee 10,772km.
Eccentricity Drops from 0.3649 to 0.1095
Cosmos 2590: No Significant Changes to Perigee, Apogee or Eccentricity
(celestrak.org)

3 Nov 25 – 5 Mar 26: Orbit Visualizations Tell the Story of Cosmos 2589 Gradual Orbit Circularization
(saberastro.com)

By Dr. Larissa Beavers

2 March 2026: Matt Burgess, an author from WIRED, reports a sharp increase in GPS/GNSS interference affecting maritime traffic in the Middle East following the outbreak of the U.S.–Israeli military campaign against Iran in February 2026. More than 1,100 ships in the Gulf region experienced GPS or AIS disruptions, largely due to jamming and spoofing attacks that manipulated navigation signals, causing vessels to appear in false locations on tracking systems. These disruptions significantly increased the risk of collisions, navigation errors, and maritime accidents while contributing to the near halt of shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, a critical global energy chokepoint. The incident demonstrates how conflicts on Earth can directly target space-enabled services—specifically satellite-based positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT)—highlighting the vulnerability of space-derived infrastructure to electronic warfare and signaling interference.

Key Points in Burgess’ “Attack on GPS Spikes Amid US and Israeli War on Iran”:

• The disruption of GPS signals affecting over 1,100 vessels demonstrates how space-enabled services such as PNT can be targeted during regional conflicts.
• Interference with satellite navigation has contributed to major shipping disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz, one of the world’s most critical maritime trade routes.
• The spike in interference reinforces the need for multi-constellation navigation, signal authentication, and spectrum protection to ensure continuity of space-enabled services during geopolitical crises.
• GNSS interference is significantly cheaper and easier to deploy than kinetic attacks, making it an attractive tool for states seeking to deny space-enabled services without escalating to physical attacks on satellites.
• The incident illustrates how terrestrial conflict can exploit vulnerabilities in space-based infrastructure, reinforcing the importance of resilient PNT architectures and alternative navigation methods.
• As of 4 March, WINDWARD reports only four vessels were able to transit during the day – resulting in a 42.86% from 2 March 2026.

AIS positions falsely placing vessels on Iranian land due to GPS jamming detected across Gulf region
WINDWARD

Straight of Hormuz Crossings 3 March
WINDWARD

By Dr. Larissa Beavers

2026: CrowdStrike released the 2026 Global Threat Report, which claims that China-linked cyber adversaries’ growing focus on exploiting network perimeter and edge devices—such as VPNs, firewalls, and gateways—poses a significant risk to organizations in the space domain. Many space systems rely on interconnected ground infrastructure and internet-facing network equipment, making these edge devices attractive entry points for attackers seeking persistent access. By rapidly exploiting newly disclosed vulnerabilities, these actors can establish long-term footholds in ground networks that support satellite operations, mission control, and data processing. Such access could enable intelligence collection, disruption of mission-critical services, or lateral movement into more sensitive operational systems. As this tradecraft is expected to continue into 2026, space sector organizations may face increasing pressure to secure edge infrastructure that underpins satellite and ground segment networks.

Summary of CrowdStrikes Analysis on China Nexus Threat Actors (From 2026 Global Threat Report:

• In 2025, China-linked actors operationalized public exploits within days of disclosure.
• This speed reflects significant state-sponsored resources for rapid vulnerability research and exploit development.
• OPERATOR PANDA exploited CVE-2025-25257 six days after a public POC release.
• PHANTOM PANDA exploited CVE-2025-31324 three days after the vendor disclosed it.
• China-linked cyber actors weaponized newly disclosed vulnerabilities within days, quickly targeting space ground systems, satellite control networks, or mission infrastructure.
• Custom malware and global C2 infrastructure enable adversaries to maintain long-term network access, posing risks to satellite operations, ground stations, and mission data.
• China-linked cyber actors are expected to continue exploiting vulnerabilities in internet-facing systems (e.g., routers, firewalls, remote access devices) to expose space mission networks, satellite control systems, and ground infrastructure.
• Adversaries can exploit newly disclosed vulnerabilities and maintain undetected access for extended periods, enabling collection against sectors supporting space operations.

CORRECTION: This Image is NOT USSF-87…Actually Russian Elektro-L No 5 &
Iranian Jam-E Jam-1 Satellites.
(@mickeywzx via X)

25 Feb 2026: Chinese satellite imagery from February 24 shows something that was not there during Midnight Hammer: F-16 Fighting Falcons on the tarmac at Diego Garcia. Two of them. Alongside two P-8A Poseidons, a C-5M Super Galaxy, a C-17, and three KC-135 tankers.
(Jan Barry Foster via LinkedIn)

Late 1960’s Graphic of Soviet Manned Lunar Lander
(@RussianSpaceWeb via X)

Evolving Artemis Launch Plans & Objectives.
(@Arcadecabz via X)

China Celebrates the Year of the Fire Horse: Chang’e with her companion, the jade rabbit Yutu, greeting the Taikonaut on the surface of Swan Lake in Hefei, the capital of Anhui.
(CCTV-1, screened by K. Karwowski on February 16, 2026, The Space Review)