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Issue 145

07 Strategic Analysis · China · Space

China and the Fight for Orbital Dominance

The growing competition in space between the United States and China is no longer theoretical or confined to science fiction. The recent Financial Times interactive report “Space Weapons” does a particularly good job packaging together many of the trends those of us in the space community have been watching for years. While there is not much in the article that will surprise regular readers of The Flash, it provides a solid overview of where the modern counterspace environment is heading. The article draws from Chinese military textbooks, research papers tied to the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), and U.S.…

Author Greg Gillinger Published May 18, 2026

The growing competition in space between the United States and China is no longer theoretical or confined to science fiction. The recent Financial Times interactive report “Space Weapons” does a particularly good job packaging together many of the trends those of us in the space community have been watching for years. While there is not much in the article that will surprise regular readers of The Flash, it provides a solid overview of where the modern counterspace environment is heading. The article draws from Chinese military textbooks, research papers tied to the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), and U.S. military assessments and explains how the major powers are preparing for warfare in space and why satellites have become critical strategic targets.

The report highlights how China continues investing heavily in counterspace-related capabilities including anti-satellite weapons, electronic warfare, cyber operations, robotic servicing satellites, and advanced surveillance systems. Particularly concerning are capabilities tied to targeting, tracking, and persistent observation in the Indo-Pacific region. The article also touches on China’s growing interest in secure communications technologies, such as quantum communications, an area that Beijing continues to pursue aggressively.

One of the more interesting parts of the report is how openly some PLA-affiliated writings discuss potential wartime actions in space. The article walks through a range of options that Chinese strategists have considered, including cyberattacks against satellite networks, jamming communications, dazzling or damaging systems with lasers, physically capturing satellites, deploying orbital “blockades,” and even using debris itself as a weapon. Some writings reportedly discuss targeting launch infrastructure, interfering with command-and-control nodes, or disrupting the information systems that modern militaries rely on to function. The overall theme is less about dramatic Hollywood-style destruction and more about paralyzing an opponent’s ability to collect, move, and act on information.

At the same time, both China and the United States are racing to build more resilient space architectures. Rather than relying on a small number of expensive satellites, there is a growing shift toward large constellations in low Earth orbit designed to complicate targeting and improve survivability. This is one reason systems like SpaceX’s Starlink have drawn so much attention from military planners around the world.

Overall, the article paints a picture of a rapidly intensifying competition in orbit driven by vulnerability, technological advancement, and growing distrust between major powers. Space is increasingly viewed not as a sanctuary, but as critical terrain that could shape the outcome of future conflicts long before forces ever engage directly on Earth. More importantly, the report highlights how thin the line has become between routine space operations and activities that could quickly be interpreted as hostile escalation.