Issue 71

Secure World Foundation: 2023 Threats to Space

13 Apr 2023: Secure World Foundation released their most excellent Threats to Space annual report. Read the whole report at the link above, it is a great historical record as well as an update on the latest developments. Here are some highlights from this year's report. RUSSIA: - There is strong evidence Russia…

13 Apr 2023: Secure World Foundation released their most excellent Threats to Space annual report. Read the whole report at the link above, it is a great historical record as well as an update on the latest developments. Here are some highlights from this year’s report.

RUSSIA:

– There is strong evidence Russia embarked on a set of programs since 2010 to regain many of its Cold War-era counterspace capabilities. Since 2010, Russia tested technologies for RPO in both LEO and GEO that could lead to or support a co-orbital ASAT capability. Some of those efforts have links to a Cold War-era LEO co-orbital ASAT program.

-After more than a decade of development and testing, Russia successfully demonstrated a DA-ASAT capability against a LEO satellite in 2021. It is unclear whether this system, the Nudol, will become operational soon, and it does not appear to have the capability to threaten targets beyond LEO.

-The Russian Army fields several types of mobile EW systems, some of which can jam specific satellite communications user terminals within tactical ranges. Russia can likely jam communications satellites uplinks over a wide area from fixed ground stations facilities.

-New evidence suggests Russia may be developing high-powered space-based EW platforms to augment its existing ground-based platforms.

-Russia is pursuing lofty goals of incorporating EW capabilities throughout its military to both protect its own space-enabled capabilities and degrade or deny those capabilities to its adversary. In space, Russia is seeking to mitigate the superiority of U.S. space assets by fielding a number of ground-, air-, and space-based offensive capabilities.

CHINA:

-China has conducted multiple tests of technologies for close approach and rendezvous in both low-earth orbit (LEO) and geostationary earth orbit (GEO) that could lead to a co-orbital ASAT capability.

-Public evidence indicates they have not conducted an actual destructive intercept of a target, and there is no proof these technologies are definitively being developed for counterspace use as opposed to intelligence gathering or other purposes.

-China has at least one, and possibly as many as three, programs underway to develop DA-ASAT capabilities, either as dedicated counterspace systems or as midcourse missile defense systems that could provide counterspace capabilities.

-Chinese military doctrine places a heavy emphasis on electronic warfare as part of the broader information warfare, and in recent years, China has taken steps to integrate space, cyber, and electronic warfare capabilities under a single military command.

-While there is significant evidence of Chinese scientific research and development of EW capabilities for counterspace applications and some open-source evidence of Chinese EW counterspace capabilities being deployed, there is no public evidence of their active use in

military operations.

-China has recently designated space as a military domain, and military writings state that the goal of space warfare and operations is to achieve space superiority using offensive and defensive means in connection with their broader strategic focus on asymmetric cost imposition, access denial, and information dominance.